SIX INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN SOCIAL FORMATION

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Intellectual output and the development of the Brazilian social formation are two inherently linked phenomena. Intellectuals try to analyze (and orient) the society, which at the same time conditions them. This conditioning reflects, on the one hand, the imperative of the changing reality and, on the other, class commitments and ideological options.

The objective of this article is to analyze the main interpretations concerning the development of the Brazilian social formation. Therefore, instead of examining the liquidation of the agrarian-mercantile society, the populist period and its crisis, the authoritarian technobureaucratic-capitalist alliance and its collapse, and the perspectives that are opening up for the present Brazilian society, I will attempt to analyze the intellectual interpretations linked to these facts and their transformations.

Any type of classification or theory concerning Brazilian society is necessarily arbitrary. While acknowledging this I nevertheless believe it possible to attempt a classification. Six or seven different interpretations appear in succession and enter into conflict in the intellectual scenario of the last fifty years. There is (1) the agrarian destiny interpretation that entered into conflict in the forties and fifties with the (2) national bourgeois interpretation. This conflict was overcome by a series of new facts that took place in the fifties and exhausted themselves with the Revolution of 1964. At this point there arose (3) the modernizing authoritarian interpretation belonging to the new system of domination, while at the same time the intellectuals of the left were divided among three not always clearly distinguished interpretations: (4) the functional-capitalist; (5) the imperialist super exploitation; and (6) that of the new dependency. Finally, starting in the mid-seventies when the 1964 regime began to enter into crisis, a new interpretation of the project for the hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie began to take shape.
THE MAIN ACTORS

These interpretations are obviously related to the classes and fractions of classes within Brazilian society. At first the mercantile bourgeoisie was divided into an export sector and an import-substitution sector. The export sector came into conflict with the urban petite bourgeoisie and from this conflict the industrial bourgeoisie and the technobureaucratic “middle” class sprang up. Within the framework of import-substitution industrialization the growth of the bureaucratic state began. Populism resulted from the alliance of these new classes with urban workers under the auspices of the large latifúndios which revolved around the internal market. The crisis of populism and the rearrangement of class alliances—excluding workers and strengthening the forces of military technobureaucrats and civil planners—followed, marked by the Revolution of 1964. This stage finally collapsed during the second half of the seventies.

Throughout this process, the principal players have been the speculative mercantile bourgeoisie, the industrial petty bourgeoisie, the middle-level civil, and the military technobureaucrats (frequently called the “middle class”), the urban workers and, as non-actors, the rural workers and the urban marginalized elements.

Among these actors, perhaps the most complex and divided have been the technocrats. Although they first made their presence known in the thirties, it was only in the fifties and more importantly in the sixties that they constituted a politically and historically significant class. Their members are neither bourgeois, petit bourgeois, nor wage workers directly related to production (proletariat) but rather coordinative workers who receive salaries from large organizations. They constitute a social class to the extent that they assume or lend to assume ownership of the bureaucratic organization, defined by its technobureaucratic relationship to production.

Generally defined, these new actors are proprietors not only of the relations of production but also of their own ideology. Technobureaucrats, or intellectuals in the broadest sense (including technical experts and administrators), are subdivided into public (military) and private (civilian) technobureaucrats. However, not all intellectuals fit this categorisation, some are petit bourgeois intellectuals who work for themselves.

It is important to distinguish clearly between the petite bourgeoisie (related to small mercantile production) and the bourgeoisie. The petite bourgeoisie has been part
of Brazilian society since its formation. It participates directly in production and also
employs wage labor. Such has been the case with the craftsman, the small agricultural
producer, the small businessman, the doctor, and the lawyer. The bourgeoisie, on the
contrary, has no direct participation in production. As an entrepreneur, he controls
workers and capital; and as a rentier, he lives off dividends, interests, and rents.

The bourgeoisie, which has also existed in Brazil since colonization, is the
speculative mercantile bourgeoisie. It appropriates economic surplus through
speculation, monopoly, favors from the state, exploitation of slave labor, and the
expropriation of peasants (by holding legal land titles). It is the bourgeoisie associated
with sugar cane as well as with coffee, yet the latter represents a more advanced stage
of the development of the productive forces. It is still dominant in the Brazilian
Northeast and Central-West; it served as a political base for the União Democrática
Nacional (UDN) and the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) in the period from 1945 to
1964. Although the bourgeoisie started to lose power with the Revolution of 1930, it
has managed through alliances with the industrial bourgeoisie and the
technobureaucrats beginning in 1964 to conserve its power (especially in the
Northeast) as a political base for ARENA and later the Partido Democrático Social
(PDS). It controls mercantile capital, including land, commercial, and banking capital.

It is tempting to consider finance capital, and a “finance” bourgeoisie, as a stage
beyond industrial capitalism. But in reality what we have is only a banking
bourgeoisie, whose capital is essentially the same as latifundio and commercial capital;
that is, capital accumulated by means of primitive accumulation and not by relative
value - primitive accumulation being a combination of authoritarian and speculative
mechanisms of appropriation excluding the mechanism of surplus value.

Finally, the industrial bourgeoisie is the class that appropriates relative surplus
by means of wage labor and the exchange of equivalent commodities. Industrial capital
produces surplus value by increasing productivity and exploiting workers. In terms of
the industrial bourgeoisie, the violence committed in the appropriation of surplus is the
way it ensures that labor power is considered a commodity like any other.

In Brazil the industrial bourgeoisie began to be important in the thirties, but
always in a clearly subordinate role. In the populist period from 1930 to 1964, it was
allied with and subordinated to the factions outside of the production and
commercialization of coffee – those oriented to the internal market of the old mercanti-
le bourgeoisie. Starting with 1964 when the bourgeoisie as a whole united and allied with the technobureaucracy, the industrial bourgeoisie became only one of the components of the authoritarian political pact then constituted between workers and the progressive factions of the technobureaucracy. Only since the mid-seventies and the continually explosive increase in material power on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie has this force initiated a project of political hegemony.

Obviously the distinction between mercantile and industrial capital is not crystal clear; many gray areas exist. Yet it is important to understand that what distinguishes one type of capital from the other is not the function of the activity exercised. This is a historical-economic classification. Consequently, export-oriented plantations, large import and export businesses, and the banking system were mercantile capital, but not every agricultural, commercial, or banking enterprise needed to integrale mereantile capital. When technical progress became dominant, its capital became industrial or productive instead of speculative or mercantile.

The mercantile bourgeoisie, industrial bourgeoisie, the technobureaucrats, and urban workers have been the principal actors in the social formation of Brazil; the intellectuals have been its author. When I became 20 in the early fifties, I participated—often vehemently—in the debate around these interpretations. For this reason, I do not pretend to be ideologically neutral or emotionally impartial although I do seek to be objective.

**THE AGRARIAN DESTINY INTERPRETATION**

Two great antagonistic interpretations concerning Brazilian society were in conflict in the forties and fifties - the hegemonic interpretation of Brazil’s agromercantile bourgeoisie and that of the national bourgeoisie.

The interpretation of the agrarian destiny of Brazilian society corresponds to the hegemony of the agromercantile bourgeoisie, which prevailed until the twenties and thereafter faced a constant challenge to its domination. Yet even in the forties and fifties this was the hegemonic interpretation even though the agromercantile bourgeoisie no longer exclusively controlled the state.

This is the interpretation of Brazil as an essentially agriculturat nation – a country full of natural resources and friendliness – yet tropical and mestizo and as a
result inferior. This is the nation of Oliveira Vianna (1922) who sees it becoming increasingly white; of Paulo Prado (1928) whose view is of a sad and melancholy nation in a radiant land; of Mano de Andrade’s Brazil of Macunaima; and of the bourgeois prerevolution represented by the Week of Modern Art. It is a modern Brazil due to coffee and São Paulo, authoritarian and corrupt but curable by a democracy of the elites according to the vision of the Mesquita family (who controlled O Estado de São Paulo) and that of Paulo Duarte. It is also the arrogant Brazil of Afonso Celso, the “Brasil maravilhoso” of the big house and the slave quarters, the mansion and shack of Gilberto Freire, the essentially agrarian Brazil of Murtinho and Eugênio Gudin,

This interpretation, the product of a lengthy agrarian-mercantile domination, covers an ample period of time and is extremely varied. It would be a disservice to reduce it to a few essential characteristics, with its important and innovative thinkers including (as well as those already named) a series of pioneers with more critical analyses such as Euclides da Cunha, Alberto Torres, Sílvio Romero, and José Veríssimo.

At any rate, according to this interpretation Brazil is not seen as an underdeveloped country but rather as a rich nation with a bright and definitively agrarian future. Politically, Brazil is seen as a presidential democracy in the North American style although it did not go beyond an oligarchical regime. Socially, it is viewed as a society with neither social nor racial conflicts although only by repression have that conflict been reduced. Culturally, this interpretation ignores that Brazilian culture at that time was, on the one hand, a merely ornamental, “drawing room” culture, divorced from the development of the productive forces. On the other hand, it was a transplanted culture, incapable of an original or critical theoretical formulation.1

THE NATIONAL-BOURGEOIS INTERPRETATION

The national bourgeois interpretation, which emerged in the forties and reached its full development in the fifties, reflects the economic and political changes that occurred principally after 1930. It was the interpretation of the Communist Party and the main interpretation of the Itatiaia Group. The Itatiaia Group published the magazine Cadernos de Nosso Tempo from 1953 to 1955 and finally came together in the Instituto
Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB) which, after several internal conflicts, was liquidated by the Revolution of 1964. It was also (although to a lesser extent) the interpretation of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) economists.

The ISEB group had several proponents. Helio Jaguaribe (1956, 1958a, 1958b, 1962) was the main political scientist of the group, if not its main theoretical formulator – although Ignácio Rangel, economist (1957a, 1957b, 1960, 1962), and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, sociologist (1954, 1958, 1960), were also key figures. Other important personages were Roland Corbisier (1958), Cândido Mendes de Almeida (1963), Alvaro Vieira Pinto (1957, 1960), and Ewaldo Correa Lima (1956).

None of the authors were Marxist, yet Marx's influence is clearly apparent especially in the thinking of Ignácio Rangel, who constructs a particularly original and dialectical model of Brazilian development centered on the concepts of basic duality, long-term cycles, idle capacity, and cost-pushing inflation. A Marxist who indirectly belonged to this group was Nelson Werneck Sodré, the main intellectual of the Brazilian Communist Party, who published various works (1957a, 1957b, 1959, and 1961) through the ISEB. Along the same lines we have contributions of Alberto Passos Guimarães (1963, 1964) which analyze the plantation and monopolistic character of the Brazilian economy within the framework of an orthodox Marxist perspective.

The national-bourgeois interpretation began with a radical criticism of the interpretation of Brazil's agrarian vocation. Brazilian culture was defined as alienated, heterogeneous, transplanted, amorphous, inauthentic, ornamental, and marked by a colonial inferiority complex. Starting from this sharp criticism of the oligarchic and semicolonial culture that dominated the country, the new interpreters proposed the formulation of a national project for industrialization and political independence.

In order to formulate this project, it was necessary to depart from the simplified and ideologically compromised (although basically correct) interpretation of the Brazilian historical process. This interpretation saw society as divided into two large blocks: On the one hand, the dominant agromercantile oligarchy, allied with imperialism, was opposed to Brazilian industrialization and sought to maintain the semicolonial, semifeudal, and primary export status quo. On the other, under Getúlio Vargas’s and Juscelino Kubitschek’s leadership, there was the modernizing group—the national industrial bourgeoisie, the middle technical classes (the technobureaucrats, and urban workers, along with the nonexporting fractions of the old oligarchy). According to the national-bourgeois interpretation, the leadership of this group naturally fell
to the new-born industrial bourgeoisie who had as its prototype Roberto Simonsen and, to a lesser extent, Ewaldo Lodi. It was the “national bourgeoisie” (a mental construct with a certain base in reality) that according to their interpretation, would be nationalist, industrializing, socially modern, and progressive, whereas the agromercantile bourgeoisie would be colonial, traditional, favoring agriculture, and against industrialization.

Those who formulated the national-bourgeois interpretation were both verifying and analyzing a reality that later would be called the populist pact and acting as instruments of a bourgeois ideology. The “national bourgeoisie” in conflict with imperialism and especially the “feudal” nature of Brazilian society up until 1930 were untenable ideological constructs to which the Communist Party adhered in a decided manner in this period, thus mechanically transposing the historical steps of vulgar Marxism and of Stalinism to Brazil.

However, the national-bourgeois ideology was not only bourgeois. It was also the first manifestation of an ideology of modernization, developmentalist, and geared to efficiency, witnessing the birth of technobureaucracy within the state apparatus. The intellectuals who formulated this ideology (to which we should add the names of Jesus Soares Pereira, Romulo de Almeida, Santiago Dantas, and Roberto Campos) were members of the technobureaucracy who would assume command of Brazil’s development from the populist state (see my examination of the technobureaucratic aspect of the populist state [1977a: 189-193]).

Nevertheless, it should be observed that this description of the national-bourgeois interpretation is a generalization that omits an enormous number of specifics. For example, the ISEB entered into crisis and underwent a split in 1958 emanating from the critical and independent position of Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1961, 1963) who adopted a non-Marxist left position and came to criticize the ISEB itself (which, for other motives, Helio Jaguaribe also left) in the process of his political radicalization and his links to the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB). This position had certain similarities with that of Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (1963).

This interpretation is contemporary with the analysis of Caio Prado Jr. who made a definitive interpretation of colonial Brazil (1933, 1942, 1945), and that of Celso Furtado (1949, 1954, 1959a, 1961, 1962, 1964). Furtado contributed to ECLA’s critique of neoclassical theory on development, specifically concerning the law of the comparative advantages of international commerce; made an analysis of the primary-
export model and more generally of Brazilian underdevelopment; and proposed import-substitution industrialization and economic planning.

Because of their originality and depth, the analyses by Caio Prado Jr. and Celso Furtado of the Brazilian economy are virtual paradigms unable to be reduced to a more general interpretation. Caio Prado Jr’s position was antagonistic to that of his contemporaries, and permitted him after 1964 to establish the bases of a new interpretation of Brazil. The contributions of Celso Furtado (who published two works with the ISEB, in 1958 and 1959b) were decisive in the national-bourgeois interpretation. Another isolated contribution of the same epoch that should be mentioned is Raymondo Faoro’s work (1957) of Weberian origin, which has become a classic today.

In the same way as the ISEB group, Celso Furtado was concerned with making a critique of the theories developed in the central countries and with constructing an alternative theory capable of explaining the Brazilian/Latin American reality. Celso Furtado and the ECLA group were more successful in this task because they were less ideologically compromised with the bourgeoisie. Yet we can clearly see that ECLA’s industrialization project and the national construction project under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie and the state have many points in common. The ideas of planning and substitution industrialization were central to both.

THE MODERNIZING-AUTHORITARIAN INTERPRETATION

The national-bourgeois interpretation practically liquidated the colonial-mercantile interpretation to the extent that industrialization became definitive and victorious in the fifties. The political crisis in the beginning of the sixties and the subsequent Revolution of 1964 in turn took care of liquidating the national-bourgeois interpretation. These two facts condition Brazilian thinking concerning politics and economics. While it is true that the four interpretations about to be analyzed had been articulated before 1964, it is an error to think that debates in the social sciences are resolved on the grounds of ideas and ideologies. Generally it is new historical facts that come into conflict with ideas and reorient them despite the immobility of thought of so many social scientists.

The annihilation of the national-bourgeois interpretation was automatic to the extent that its main political proposal was the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the
'proletariat under the auspices of the state technobureaucracy against the agromercantile bourgeoisie and imperialism. The Revolution of 1964 represents the definitive breaking of this alliance and the unification of the industrial and mercantile bourgeoisie under the political command of the state technobureaucracy and under the protection of multinational imperialism. It became impossible to speak of a bourgeois revolution, a national bourgeoisie, and the alliance of the left with the bourgeoisie after the violent bourgeois repression of the left and workers.

However, new interpretations emerged after 1964. In terms of the dominant classes, the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation replaced the agromercantile interpretation as hegemonic. It was clearly set apart from that interpretation to the extent that it favored industrialization and planning as did the national-bourgeois interpretation.

This new interpretation is based on two key ideas—economic development and national security—and on a political alliance between the now unified local bourgeoisie, the state technobureaucracy, and the multinational enterprises. In the final analysis, the 1964 military coup was the fruit of the crisis of populism that evolved from the unification of the agromercantile and the industrial bourgeoisie. The unification, in turn, created a new cleavage (but not a new conflict) within the bourgeoisie to the extent that monopoly capital - industrial as well as banking - became dominant over competitive capital.

At the same time that the unification of the bourgeoisie occurred, the industrial multinationals were penetrating the Brazilian economy; there was no alternative left to the state technobureaucracy (in order to carry out its developmental project for Brazil as a world power) other than to ally itself with the monopolist bourgeoisie and the multinationals.

This is why the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation, aside from its essentially bourgeois nature (in defending “free enterprise”) is also a technobureaucratic interpretation that favors economic planning and direct intervention by the state in the economy not only as a regulator but also as a producer of goods and services. The industrializing, modernizing, bourgeois, and technobureaucratic project of the national bourgeoisie appears again in the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation. What disappears is the nationalist discourse and also the popular or populist one. The nationalist discourse disappears because industrialization is consolidated by customs protection (the 1958 Tax Law) and by the alliance of the local bourgeoisie with the now multinational industrial enterprises. Popular discourse became unnecessary because workers were excluded from the social pact. Rather than
an alliance with workers. The official line became national security which, in the context of 1964, meant police repression of workers and the left.

From one perspective, it could be stated that on the level of the dominant classes the hegemony of the modernizing authoritarian interpretation represented the victory of the Escola Superior de Guerra (the fundamental ideological agent of this new interpretation) over the ISEB, the Communist Party, and ECLA (the basic agents of the national-bourgeois interpretation). It also represented the victory of North American imperialism that, by means of its systematic training of the Brazilian police and military as well as by penetrating industrializing multinationals succeeded in imposing a “national security doctrine” on the Brazilian military based on the cold war and an irrational anti-Communism.

Of course the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation had its origins before 1964. As an exhaustive analysis of the question is not possible here, I will mention only its two key formulators: General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who already in 1952 had defined the bases of the national security doctrine (1967: 19-64); and Roberto de Oliveira Campos who sought “the possible area of conciliation between an Ideology of development and an Ideology of security” in the Escola Superior de Guerra (1963: 59).

Roberto Campos, who emerged in the fifties as one of the most brilliant Brazilian technobureaucrats, is probably the main founder of this new interpretation of Brazil—especially from the point of view of economics. In much the same way that General Golbery in 1958 diagnosed the essential political dependence that Brazil had developed in relation to the United States (1967: 223-259) while also advocating an authoritarian national security ideology, Roberto Campos defined Brazil’s essential economic dependence in relation to multinational corporations. Perceiving that the multinational enterprises would come to invest heavily in industry and thus commit themselves to Brazil’s industrialization, he became their most articulate defender (1963b, 1968, 1969). Defense of multinationals in the framework of the international division of labor where Brazil would be left with a primary-exporting function was the thesis of Eugênio Gudin. Gudin sought to criticize Raul Prebisch’s and ECLA’s theory against the law of the comparative advantages of international commerce. Although a disciple of Eugênio Gudin, Roberto Campos is clearly distinguished from him in this respect.
While generally considered a neoclassical economist, Campos clearly set himself apart from this group in his defense of economic planning (1963b) and of the technocracy as the agent of this planning. Planning is justified because of the “weakness of private initiative,” the visionary or long-term perspective of the state (which the bourgeoisie does not have), and the state’s ability to “concentrate resources” (1963b: 114-116). During the period in which he was Minister of Planning (1964-1966), Campos wrote an article entitled “In Defense of Technocrats” stating that “between perfectionist immobitism and modernizing experimentation the technocrats’ attitude seems to be more productive” (1968: 136). In this way—by defending economic planning and the technobureaucracy, yet at the same time defending local and multinational capitalism and utilizing monetarist instruments to combat inflation—Roberto Campos succeeded in coopting the neoclassical analysis with the technobureaucratic perspective on economic planning. This was an essential economic element of the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation.

THE FUNCTIONAL-CAPITALIST INTERPRETATION

Whereas the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation remained hegemonic in terms of the dominant classes until the mid-seventies, three alternative interpretations arose on the left: the functional-capitalist; the capitalist superexploitation; and the new dependency interpretations.

The functional-capitalist interpretation was to dominate a large part of the thinking of the Brazilian left during the second half of the sixties. Its basic postulate was that Brazil had always been a capitalist country, or that the precapitalism that existed was always functional for capitalist accumulation. It questioned the interpretations of the Brazilian situation starting with a critique of the national-bourgeois interpretation. This interpretation was blamed for the Revolution of 1964 and for the consequent defeat of the left—a result of its proposal for modernization and the alliance between the working class and the bourgeoisie. It was necessary to put this interpretation on trial and place the Communist Party and the ISEB group on the whipping posts as those responsible.

In order to deny the validity of the national-bourgeois interpretation, it was also necessary to deny the precapitalist (or even mercantile capitalist) character of Brazilian
society before 1930, criticize any type of dualist theory, affirm the continuity and perfect unity of the Brazilian dominant class, and deny that the industrial entrepreneurs had different social and ethnic origins than those of the agromercantile bourgeoisie. In order to carry out this radical negation of the entire national-bourgeois interpretation (rather than limiting itself to a critique of its exaggerations in terms of its ideological proposition), this interpretation took on an emotional and resentful attitude. This position, while it succeeded in sharpening its critical capabilities suffered from its inability to understand or correctly analyze the new historical facts that made the national-bourgeois interpretation outdated.

The functional-capitalist interpretation was formulated brilliantly by Caio Prado Jr., who, in 1966, published a book fundamental for the understanding of all later Brazilian thinking: *A Revolução Brasileira*. It is a passionate analysis, a criticism, and self-criticism of Brazilian relations of production. It is full of errors due to its resentment, yet at the same time a brave, pioneering, indignant analysis coherent with Prado’s prior theories concerning the mercantile nature of Brazilian colonialization (1942, 1945) and concerning the nature of the agrarian question (1979). It is mistaken in that it affirms a capitalist continuity that Brazil never had; it is not concerned with clearly differentiating the mercantile bourgeoisie from the industrial bourgeoisie; it affirms that the industrial bourgeoisie had its origins in the coffee-producing oligarchy; and it denies that at one point in history these two bourgeoisies entered in conflict. It is pioneering in that it recognizes the industrializing nature of the new imperialism; it identifies “bureaucratic capitalism” and perceives that the bureaucratic state serves capitalist accumulation; it denounces the permanent exploitation of Brazilian peasants and rural workers; and it deals with the relations of production in the countryside and seeks to show that many of those who are considered peasants in Brazil (for example, sharecroppers) are in fact wage workers.

In response to Assis Tavares’s criticisms, Caio Prado Jr. has confirmed the critical nature of this work and has sought to find out who is to blame for Brazil’s situation:

A Revolução Brasileira intends, rightly or wrongly (and it is this which Assis Tavares should have investigated and did not) to find a “qualitatively different “position for the left which opens up new perspectives for them, and which frees them from the opportunism and sectarianism which for a long time has made their efforts sterile and useless – which among other examples, allowed the
counterrevolutionary coup of April 1 to occur. The main responsibility for the ineffectiveness of the left (and it is which “A Revolução Brasileira’ affirms and seeks to prove) is the left’s erroneous theoretical base [1967: 57]

Another basic work along this critical one is Rodolfo Stavenhagen’s classic article (1965) that decisively influenced an entire generation and epoch in Brazilian thought. He argued against seven mistaken theses: (1) dualism; (2) development via the diffusion of industrialism into traditional areas; (3) traditional zones as obstacles to progressive capitalism; (4) a national bourgeoisie interested in breaking the domination of the large landholding oligarchy; (5) development dependent on a nationalist and progressive middle class; (6) the national integration of Latin America based on miscegenation; and (7) an identity of interests between peasants and urban workers. In summary and excluding the last two points, Stavenhagen makes a decisive and radical critique of the modernizing concepts implicit in the national bourgeoisie interpretation.

The functional-capitalist interpretation is supported by a series of other highly significant names. Fernando Novaes made a classical analysis of the Brazilian colonial period in his 1973 thesis (published in 1979) along the same lines originally proposed by Caio Prado ir. It denies any sort of precapitalist nature in the colonial period, seeing this exclusively as one episode in the process of primitive mercantile accumulation.

João Manoel Cardoso de Mello (1975) follows Fernando Novaes’s analysis up to the present. His historical analysis places him within the context of the functional-capitalist interpretation because he minimizes the importance of the Revolution of 1930; states that “the coffee producing bourgeoisie was the matrix for the industrial bourgeoisie” (1975: 103); and criticizes, as Robert Cajado Nicol (1974) and Warren Dean (1971) do, the opposition or contradiction delected by Furtado between industrialization and the expansion of coffee production. The latter was seen exclusively as a positive factor for industrialization.3

However, Cardoso de Mello’s work is of great importance because after Caio Prado Jr.’s História Econômica do Brasil, it is the first significant interpretation of Brazilian economic history in nonorthodox Marxist terms. He proposes an alternative historical scheme to that of the national-bourgeois interpretation in his division into economic phases. In contrast to the Colonial-Mercantile period up to 1808, the Semi-Colonial Agrarian-Mercantile Primary Exporting period up to 1930, and the Industrial
Import Substitution period up to the present, he proposes (1975: 195) the Colonial Slave-Mercantile up to 1808, National Slave Mercantile up to 1888, and Backward Exporting-Capitalist up to the present. The latter phase is divided into the birth and consolidation of industrial capital (1808-1933), restricted industrialization and heavy industrialization (1956 to present).

One should note, however, that especially in looking at heavy industrialization Cardoso de Mello has gone beyond the functional-capitalist analysis. Although concerned with minimizing the importance of the breach of 1930, it is clear that his division by periods recognizes the important move from mercantile to industrial capital. He only places this change at the end of the last century rather than in the present one.

Another important contribution is that of Boris Fausto who, in the first two introductory paragraphs of his (1972) book, informs us that his work “intends to show the inconsistency of the prevailing model” according to which “in the country’s social formation, there exists a basic contradiction between the agrarian export sector, represented by the semifeudal latifúndio, associated with imperialism, and the interests centered around the internal market, represented by the ‘bourgeois'” (1972: 9). The work is significant in its analysis of the 1930 Revolution; but from the beginning it is marked by its functional-capitalist perspective that reduces the national-bourgeois interpretation to a simplified model that can then be denied all validity. Along the same line we have a pioneering article written by Paula Beiguelman specifically criticizing the work of one of the proponents of the national-bourgeois interpretation, Nelson Werneck Sodré. She says, “Thus one cannot interpret the agitation of the twenties and the revolution of 1930 in terms of a conflict between the internal sector and the agrarian sector, or in the author’s [Sodré] words, as a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the latifúndio” (1966: 262).

Another similar work that marked this polemic is that of Francisco de Oliveira (1972). As in Cardoso de Mello’s work, it is essentially a critique of Celso Furtado’s dualistic and modernizing vision of the Brazilian economy. The precapitalistic nature of the Brazilian social formation is not denied. What is denied is any contradiction between the precapitalist and capitalist Brazil. Precapitalist agriculture as well as urban marginality is viewed as functional for capitalist accumulation to the extent that they lower the cost of the reproduction of labor power.
By the richness of his presentation - always expounded in terms of an effectively open and dialectical Marxism - Francisco de Oliveira had a great influence on the thinking of the democratic left in Brazil. His analysis of the mechanisms of primitive accumulation still in operation in the country, his proposal for the internalization of the question of underdevelopment, and his discussion of the “swollen” tertiary sector are, among others, stimulating contributions to debate and research.

We have other contributions with similar theoretical bases from various researchers from the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP) which became an important center of Brazilian thought along with the University of São Paulo. Within CEBRAP we see the coexistence and often the mixing of the functional-capitalist and new dependency interpretations (because some of their authors moved between these groups).

Also along the creative line opened up by Francisco de Oliveira are the important works of Lúcio Kowarick (1975, 1979), responsible for a brilliant analysis of the functional relations between marginalization and dependency in the context of dependent societies, of Manoel Berlinck (1975) and also CEBRAP’s collective work, coordinated by Lúcio Kowarick and Vinicius Caldeira Brant (1976), an outstanding analysis of the accumulation process and the pauperization of the Paulista population.

One last key representative of the functional-capitalist interpretation is Luciano Martins, whose thinking is summarized in his 1976 work. In his analysis of the Revolution of 1930, we see a continuing concern with reducing its historic significance to an episode of “conservative modernization” (in terms of Barrington Moore’s [1967] conception) in which new elites were replaced by or juxtaposed against the old ones. Luciano Martins recognizes the nature of the class struggle in the 1930 Revolution but defines it “in the most precise sense as a preventative class struggle, brought about by the initiative of the dominant class” (1976: 129). He makes a point of showing and documenting that there was no conflict between the agrarian and industrial oligarchies in that in a typically oligarchical movement (as the 1930 Revolution was) “the documentation concerning the São Paulo Federation of Industry’s participation in the conflict is abundant” (1966: 133). Nevertheless, these considerations do not deny the contribution of Luciano Martins and others already mentioned of the functional-capitalist interpretation. The former’s work is essentially important not only for its analysis of the Revolution of 1930 but research on the emergence of the technobureau-
cracy and its participation in the decision-making processes with respect to the implantation of heavy industry in Brazil.

The functional-capitalist interpretation is important in that it gives the left an autonomous analysis of the Brazilian situation rather than one subordinated to the bourgeoisie (as is the case with the national-bourgeois interpretation). On the other hand, its non-Stalinist Marxist foundation permits a critical deepening of the debate over the relations between the economy and politics. It also deals with bourgeois domination in Brazil that had only previously been addressed from Marxist perspective by Caio Prado Jr. However, its excessively critical nature makes it a limited and limiting interpretation. Concerned with radically negating the entire national-bourgeois interpretation, it does not realize that despite the serious errors of this interpretation the outdating of its analysis is due less to its error and more to the new facts that took place in the fifties. This limitation explains why many of its authors tended to move to the new dependency interpretation when this became dominant among the Brazilian left.

Within this framework, Luiz Pereira emerges as an isolated figure only indirectly linked to the functional-capitalist interpretation of which, nevertheless, he is one of the pioneers. Writing in an epoch of transition, his contribution (1965) is not always clear but is rich with suggestions—especially his reinterpretation of the 1930 Revolution and his critique of the theory of structural dualism. In his opinion, what exists in Brazil is the coexistence of “dynamized” and “suffocated” capitalism (1965: 87-97, 119).

THE IMPERIALIST SUPEREXPLOITATION INTERPRETATION

The difficulty of seeing a question clearly so as to be able to analyze new facts also applies to the imperialist superexploitation interpretation. It too is an interpretation full of resentment for the defeat represented by the Revolution of 1964, but it is a much more radical interpretation. It not only criticizes the national-bourgeois interpretation and the resulting left deviations but also constructs a new interpretation of both Brazil and Latin America starting from the Leninist conception of imperialism and Trotsky’s concept of central capitalism’s loss of dynamism. Similar to the national-bourgeois
interpretation which blames imperialism for underdevelopment, it differs from that interpretation in that it sees no split in the internal bourgeoisie between the agromercantile bourgeoisie allied with imperialism and the industrial bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is solidly united and subordinate to imperialism. In this interpretation there is no “nationalist” proposal serving as a damper on the class struggle.

Imperialism extracts practically all the surplus of the underdeveloped countries. It is the fundamental obstacle to any real process of development. The local bourgeoisie is completely subordinated to imperialism. As imperialism exploits local workers through international commerce and multinational enterprises, the local bourgeoisie has no alternative in the process of appropriating surplus other than to superexploit workers and to resort to violence for this superexploitation. The conclusion is that the alternative for Brazil and the rest of Latin America is either socialism or fascism as dependent capitalism is necessarily fascist.

One of the bases for this thesis is found in André Gunder Frank’s works—his classical article of 1966 and a series of books starting with *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967). These seek to prove the radical theory that Latin America has always been capitalist (never having shown precapitalist characteristics) and that European colonization had been purely mercantile and thus capitalist. By establishing a primary export-capitalist model, capitalism and imperialism are shown to be basic causes of underdevelopment. This can be seen by the fact that the most underdeveloped regions of the continent were in the past the most important mercantile exporters.

Along a similar line, Ruy Mauro Marini (1969, 1973) develops a “theory of superexploitation.” It is curious that Marini acknowledges that during a certain period there were common interests between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that “led a vanguard petit-bourgeoisie to reformism and a policy of class collaboration” (1969; 151) and yet “the military pronouncement of 1964 dealt a fatal blow to the reformist lide.” Thus, the national-bourgeois interpretation is identified with reformism although it is admitted that it had a certain validity at one point in time.

Reformism failed because Brazil’s development was essentially based on the superexploitation of workers: Workers were being paid wages below the subsistence level while the length and intensity of the work day was being increased. This superexploitation, the normal tendency in capitalist countries, is accentuated in the dependent or peripheral countries because they are subjected to the imperialism of the
central capitalist countries who take a part of the surplus value from them by means of
the unequal exchange of commodities in the international market. As a consequence,
the nations disfavored by this unequal exchange do not necessarily try to correct
the disequilibrium between prices and the value of their export commodities
(which would imply an intensified effort to increase the productive capacity of
labor) but rather seek to compensate the losses originated in international
commerce by means of the superexploitation of workers [1973:37].

This superexploitation implies a breach in the exchange of equivalents. Labor is
no longer paid according to its value. To obtain these results, the bourgeoisie is forced
to resort to authoritarian methods. Furthermore, in the framework of an international
division of labor, the Brazilian bourgeoisie acts as subimperialist by exporting its
manufactured products to even more underdeveloped countries (superexploitation
hinders the formation of an internal market).

Along this line, Theotônio dos Santos (1967, 1970, 1973) makes it clear that the
alternative for Brazil and Latin America is either socialism or fascism. His analysis is
not limited to this aspect but, as with Ruy Mauro Marini, makes an important
contribution to the radical critique of the underdeveloped and authoritarian Latin
American and Brazilian models.

With relation to dependency, Theotônio dos Santos identifies three historical
forms: (1) commercial-export colonial dependence; (2) industrial-finance dependence,
which was consolidated at the end of the nineteenth century; and (3) industrial-
technological dependence in the postwar period practiced by multinational enterprises
(1970: 55). This last type of dependence gives rise to a kind of “unequal and combined
development” to the extent that underdevelopment is characterized by profound
inequalities related to the superexploitation of labor. Yet as this superexploitation is
linked to the transference of surplus to the imperialist countries, inequality becomes a
structural element of the world economy. This is why Latin American development is
consolidated as well as unequal.

Although dos Santos (1973) makes an important and relatively pioneering
analysis of the new fact, represented by the multinational manufacturing enterprises
that began to appear in the fifties, he fails to perceive that it is not just the nature of
dependency that has changed. The degree of exploitation has also changed to the extent
that the multinationals became directly involved in the Brazilian industrialization process. In analyzing the extent to which external imperialism and internal superexploitation (both closely related) sharpened the class struggle in a way that cannot be sustained, dos Santos makes a radical conclusion concerning the intrinsically fascist nature of the Latin American bourgeoisie:

Everything indicates that what awaits us is a long process of profound political and military confrontations, of deep social radicalization which brings these societies to a dilemma between governments of force which tend to lead the way to fascism, and revolutionary popular governments which lead the way to socialism [1970: 68].

Finally, I must refer to Florestan Fernandes, the true founder of the modern school of sociology in São Paulo. His independent and complex thinking make simplistic classifications impossible. His indignant analysis of the 1964 Revolution that (1) frustrates the bourgeois revolution, (2) neutralizes the military as factors of political equilibrium, and (3) definitively shows that nothing else could be expected of our conservative classes (1968: 181) leads us to place him within the functional-capitalist interpretation. His analysis of Brazilian social and political evolution, centering around two revolutionary cycles whose beginning dates are 1808 and 1888, also bring us to this conclusion.

On the other hand, he makes the distinction between a classical bourgeois revolution (which would lead Brazilian development to a pattern of autonomous, self-sufficient capitalism) and a dependent bourgeois revolution, which would only mark the transition from commercial and finance capitalism to industrial capitalism (and which he detected in Brazil). Florestan Fernandes thus comes into conflict both with the functional-capitalist interpretation as well as imperialist superexploitation interpretation to the extent that this distinction emphasizes the transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism (the Revolution of 1930 marking this passage) and finally in showing that the Brazilian bourgeoisie is not as cohesive as it pretends to be.

Yet if we consider his radical position with respect to bourgeois authoritarianism - considered an intrinsic trait in dependent bourgeoisies such as the Brazilian - his analysis comes closed to the imperialist superexploitation interpretation. Florestan Fernandes maintains a historic vision in which the bourgeoisie at a certain
point defends democratic or national positions but ends up acting in accordance with its inherent authoritarianism. In his words, “the classes in support of national bourgeois-democratic revolution come to think of themselves as the pillars of the world order of capitalism, of ‘democracy’ and of ‘Christian civilization,’” Intrinsically, this reversal of position confers new psychological, moral and political principles for the enrichment of the bourgeois domination and its transfiguration is a specifically authoritarian and totalitarian social form (1974: 316). At any rate, it seems essential to me to include Florestan Fernandes as a singular figure in the framework we seek to outline of the interpretation of Brazil.

THE NEW DEPENDENCY INTERPRETATION

Counterposed to the functional-capitalist and the superexploitation interpretations, we finally have the new dependency interpretation of the left. Although it shares in the critique of the national-bourgeois interpretation, the new dependency interpretation is much less radical. This is not because it is blind to the errors and ideological compromises of the national-bourgeois interpretation, but rather because it is able to distinguish errors and ideological compromises from new facts that occurred during the fifties.

The utilization of the concept of “new fact” is essential to this interpretation. In politics, a series of new facts, which in this case mainly occurred during the Kubitschek government, eliminated the causes for conflict between the industrial and agromercantile bourgeoisies and facilitated a national position on the part of the bourgeoisie. These new facts liquidated the alliance between the workers and the bourgeoisie, expressed by the populist pact.

These new facts, which I have examined elsewhere (1963: 20-25), are as follows: (1) the consolidation of national industry that no longer could be considered “artificial” in an “essentially agrarian nation”; (2) the definitive decadence in coffee cultivation as a result of the fall in international prices, making the transference of revenues from the export sector to the industrial sector inviable (these two new facts liquidated the relative division within the bourgeoisie); (3) the mass entry of multinational enterprises indirectly associated with the local bourgeoisie; (4) enactment of the 1958 Tax Law protecting national industry from importation of similar foreign goods (these two new facts liquidated the local bourgeoisie’s nationalism, because that nationalism was always limited to protectionism and was never opposed to the penetration of multinationals); (5) the revival of union activity during the fifties through the formation of various intersectorial agreements of syndical unity; and (6) the 1959 Cuban Revolution that frightened the local bourgeoisie. These last two facts
were directly responsible for the liquidation of the populist pact and for the radicalization of the left in the beginning of the sixties. For the first time (although immaturely) an autonomous political project was formulated. Yet in a general way, these six new facts explain the union of the industrial with the agromercantile bourgeoisie, their association with the multinationals, and their break with workers and the left. The Revolution of 1964 was to be the tragic culmination of this process.

A fundamental contribution to the new dependency interpretation was made by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in collaboration with Enzo Faletto (1970). From this book emerged what was to be called “dependency theory” — based, on the one hand, on a criticism of the modernization theories and the stages of development and, on the other hand, on a critique of the imperialist superexploitation theory. The most general proposal of the dependency concept has been to demonstrate that the external determinants (imperialism) of dependency are related to the internal determinants (class structure) that are fundamental and tend to be minimized in the national-bourgeois interpretation. “From this perspective, the analysis of dependence signifies that it should not be considered as an ‘external variable,’ but that it is possible to analyze it starting from the configuration of a system of relations between the different social classes within the dependent nations” (1970: 31).

However, what is essential in this interpretation is not the theoretical concept of dependency but what takes shape in Latin America and particularly in Brazil with the mass entry of multinational industrial enterprises. As opposed to the functional-capitalist interpretation, the new dependency interpretation does not entirely deny the validity of the national-bourgeois interpretation and recognizes that a populist and nationalist pact existed between the industrial bourgeoisie, popular urban sectors, and the nonexporting latifundio (1970: 36, 103-108, 155). At the same time it admits that “industrialization with a substitutive nature was realized on one hand through direct action by the state and, on the other, by the impulse of an ‘industrial bourgeoisie,’ to a great extent unattached to the agro-import sector” (1970: 103-104).

What is important is not to negate the prior interpretation but to recognize the new fact – in this case, foreign investments made by multinationals, that determines a
new dependence that is discriminatory and developmentalist (as opposed to what the national-bourgeois interpretation imagined, that imperialism was identified with stagnation). In the pioneering work by Cardoso and Faletto, the new dependency is characterized as the collaboration of the local bourgeoisie with the multinational industrial enterprises and with a civil and military state bureaucracy (1970: 122-125 and 134-135). Cardoso returns to the examination of the question of a new kind of imperialism and a new model of associated development in a series of essays brought together in various books (1972, 1975, 1980) that broaden and deepen the basic ideas initially developed in Chile in 1966 and 1967.

Yet in the economic sphere it was also necessary to reinterpret the new dependence. Furtado took a first (although incomplete) step in that direction with his 1966 essay in which he analyzes the new development model, based on multinational enterprises and capital-intensive, technology-sophisticated industry, that had already emerged. But Furtado was unable to perceive clearly the possibility of economic expansion, which had not yet begun, and spoke of the tendency toward stagnation. Yet in this same work he had already suggested that stagnation could be overcome, especially in Brazil (and with more difficulty in Argentina) through a new process of income concentration. A new step is taken in this direction with the publication of his Teoria e Política do Desenvolvimento Econômico (1967), a broadened reformulation of his 1961 work where the new bases of the theory of dependence were outlined. Carlos Lessa wrote his classical study (1975) in the mid-sixties, approximately at the same time that Maria Conceição Tavares wrote her fundamental work on the import-substitution model (see also my 1968 work).

The first attempts to define a new development model were made by Antonio Barros de Castro (1969: 142-143), and by Maria Conceição Tavares and José Serra (1971). I also published a small work in 1970, where I clearly related the new cycle of expansion that had been occurring since 1967 to the concentration of income of the middle and upper classes. Thus the fundamental characteristic of the “new Brazilian development model” was based on the concentration of income of the middle and upper classes; this served as the market for the dynamic industries of that period—that is, the durable consumer goods industries, and especially the automobile industry.

Nevertheless, the two most outstanding works concerning the new Brazilian development model are the essay by Tavares and Serra (1971) and Furtado’s 1972
book. The analysis takes as its point of departure the structural technological heterogeneity that Anibal Pinto (1970) described as characterizing Latin American industrialization since the early sixties. This structural heterogeneity implies the existence of a modern or monopolistic sector where the state, the multinational industrial enterprises, and large local capital joined together with the traditional or competitive sector, including the old import-substitution industry. To this new dualism should be added a process of the reconcentration of income of the middle and upper classes, which made the implantation of modern, monopolistic, technologically sophisticated industries viable in terms of a market. Thus a new development strategy was defined whereby the state, the multinationals, and local enterprises occupy complementary (rather than competitive) roles in the productive apparatus. Nevertheless this type of growth is subject to crises of realization—not only because of the problems of disproportion, but especially because of the “need for permanent and discontinuous changes in the form of the allocation of resources (generation, appropriation, and utilization of surplus) explained by the reciprocal nature of the economy with the renovated schemes of the international division of labor” (Tavares and Serra, 1971: 949).

Along the same line, Paul Singer took an original look at the crises in the Brazilian situation (1965); he made an analysis of the “Brazilian miracle” in 1972 and remarkably predicted its collapse (1973). His essays are brought together in his 1976 book. Francisco de Oliveira and Fred Mazuchelli, in their turn, made a decisive contribution to the understanding of the new accumulation pattern established in Brazil. In their 1977 essay they give only secondary importance to the functionalist nature of the precapitalist formations and concern themselves with the new pattern of accumulation that was established starting in the fifties, intelligently utilizing Marxist concepts. Their analysis of the accumulation process that occurred over the last thirty years is a work with both passion and great explanatory capacity.

Although belonging to various theoretical currents, the following works are also important for the analysis of the new Brazilian pattern of accumulation and of the respective authoritarian political model: in the field of economics, Pedro Malan and John Wells (1972), Maria Conceição Tavares (1974, 1978), Regis Bonelli and Pedro Malan (1976), Luciano Coutinho and Henri Philippe Reichstul (1977), Luis Gonzaga de Mello Belluzzo (1977), João Manoel Cardoso de Mello (1977), Carlos A. Afonso
In my works concerning the new development model, I follow the 1970 analysis in the third edition of my 1972 book, in my articles (1973, 1976), and mainly in my 1977a book. Besides formalizing the model and examining its political aspects in more detail, my concern is to deepen the analysis of the state, of the civil and military technobureaucracy that control it, and the multinational enterprises. We can see a similar concern in the works of Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1973) and Edmar Bacha. The latter has published some significant works on the new Brazilian model and on the managerial hierarchy as a determinant of the high salaries of the technobureaucrats (1973, 1974) and brings them together in one basic book (1976).

Even though they may present important divergencies, all these economic analyses are in the line of the new dependency interpretation to the extent that they seek to understand the Brazilian situation in terms of the new facts that started in the fifties. Along with the afore-mentioned contributions, Celso Furtado will continue to have a decisive role in the economic process within the framework of the new dependency through his 1974 and 1981 works.

Returning to the social and political areas, we can also mention within the framework of the new dependency interpretation (although in reality they are parallel or relatively independent approaches) the notable contribution of Francisco Weffort (1965, 1966, 1968, 1978) and of Octávio Ianni (1968, 1975) concerning populism and concerning the formation of industrial society and of capitalism in Brazil, and Juarez Brandão Lopes’s analysis of capitalist development in Brazil (1967, 1976). It is significant to note that the latter two author’s works (both published in 1976) concerning capitalism in agriculture, emphasize the recent penetration (in the last fifty years) of capitalism in agriculture, constituting an indirect disavowal of the functional-capitalist interpretation that claims that Brazil has been a capitalist social formation since the beginning of its colonization.

The recent contributions to the study of Brazilian entrepreneurs made by Eli Diniz (1978) and Diniz and Boschi (1978) should also be mentioned. They look at the question of the national bourgeoisie and its authoritarianism. There is also a large...
bibliography on agriculture, unions and the working class. Helio Jaguaribe in his turn seeks to review and update his original position but maintains his hopes of a political alliance with the bourgeoisie (1974).

Finally, a brief reference should be made to Darcy Ribeiro (1970, 1971, 1972, 1978) although his macro-vision of the process of civilization falls outside of the scope of this articie. In relation to Brazil—one of the “new peoples” that undergoes a rapid and traumatic process of “historical updating”—one can observe the strong influence of the national-bourgeois interpretation in Ribeiro. This is why he can not be classified under the functional-capitalist or imperialist superexploitation interpretations. Nevertheless he comes close to the latter due to the strong nationalist content of his analysis. he recognizes the fundamental importance of the Revolution of 1930, pointing out the fundamental change in the type of dependency that occurred during President Kubitscheck’s Plano de Metas (economic development plan), but he is unable to see that this change demands renovation of all the analytical tools along lines proposed by the new dependency interpretation. Instead, he insists in viewing multinationals as mere “suction pumps of foreign exchange” (1970: 308). However this fact does not take away from the great importance of this analysis (especially on the macro-historical level) that demonstrates both clarity and creativity and shows that Brazil has intellectuals who think and write not only about Brazil but about the entire world. This is also the case with, among others, Caio Prado Jr., Celso Furtado, Helio Jaguaribe, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROJECT FOR INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL HEGEMONY

Although classified under the new dependency interpretation, the stimulating works of Diniz and Boschi emphasize the basically authoritarian nature of Brazilian enterpreneurs. While they are correct in affirming that the authoritarian vision of the enterpreneurs appears in their emphasis on order and stability as opposed to conflict, in their preference for technical subjects rather than political ones, and in the idea of the state as the “private territory of the elites”(1978: 193-195),¹¹ this type of analysis prevents them and the Brazilian intelligentsia in general from perceiving the new facts
that underlie this authoritarianism (which reached its high point in the period from 1964 to 1974) and led the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie in the direction of a position if not more democratic at least more economically liberal (opposed to state intervention).

Only by starting from the new dependency interpretation is it possible to understand the redemocratization process that had its beginnings in Brazil starting in 1975 and principally in 1977. But even the new dependency interpretation is inadequate because it is necessary to consider other new facts that took place in the fifties, sixties, and especially the seventies.

Strictly speaking, the analysis of this process of partial democratization (abertura), controlled and held back by the government itself through its strategy, demands a new interpretation for Brazil: one of industrial capital hegemony. Yet given the limited nature of the bibliography that exists on the subject, it seems more appropriate merely to suggest what the general lines of this new interpretation would be.

The democratization process had its beginnings in Brazil at the end of 1974, immediately after the defeat of the government in the November elections and when the 1967-1973 process of expansion was exhausted. Between 1976 and 1978 I published a series of articles in Folha de São Paulo on the economic crisis, on the relative reduction of available surplus, on the campaign against increasing state control as a process of redefinition of the political model, on the partial but decisive split in the political alliance between the bourgeoisie and the state technobureaucracy, on the new political project of bourgeois hegemony, and on the new role of the left (which were published in 1978). The objective was to show that Brazil was headed for a process of necessary redemocratization, not only due to new situational facts (the economic crisis, the government’s defeat in the majority elections of 1974), but to structural reasons.

In fact, the industrial bourgeoisie that timidly emerged as an economic and political force in Brazil starting in 1930 only became the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie after the recent process of democratization. The 1930 Revolution marked the decline of the agromercantile bourgeoisie, but in the new composition of forces then established, the bourgeoisie was still a minor partner. The latifúndio substitutor of imports (rather than exporter) assumed the national political mandate. The Revolution of 1964 did not change this picture. The latifúndio and mercantile, speculative, commercial, and finance capital continued to be dominant, with the
industrial bourgeoisie remaining the minor partner. The great changes in 1964 consisted of uniting the bourgeoisie under the auspices of monopoly capital, excluding the workers, and incorporating the state technobureaucracy in the political pact.

But the industrial bourgeoisie grew and accumulated capital at a much greater rate than the other bourgeoisies throughout the entire period of 1930-1964. Industrial capital became economically dominant; it was able to aspire to political hegemony. And in 1973-1974, when the technobureaucratic-capitalist regime entered into economic crisis, the political crisis and democratization process that ensued originated from the project of the industrial bourgeoisie for political hegemony. Workers, left intellectuals, students, and the Church had struggled for a long time to reestablish democracy in Brazil. The new fact that came to alter the balance of forces was the approval of the democratic project by industrial capital, and particularly competitive industrial capital. At this point, the bourgeoisie, which was already ideologically hegemonic, also claimed political hegemony. Besides being the dominant class, it aspired to become the ruling class and thus get rid of the military technobureaucratic tutelage.14

The new structural fact lies exactly in this dominant nature of industrial capital. The industrial bourgeoisie appropriates economic surplus through relative surplus value, that is to say, by the exchange of equivalent values in the market (labor-power for commodities) and can thus make profits without directly resorting to force. For this reason and because it feels politically secure, it can dispense with the direct use of state force, which the mercantile bourgeoisie cannot, and be reasonably democratic. It can propose, as in fact it did in 1977, a social democratic pact with workers. Authoritarianism, which was functional for the bourgeoisie starting in 1964 (because of the political instability that existed then and the necessity typical of backward countries to increase the rate of accumulation), later ceased to serve this purpose. Industrial capital not only attained a “satisfactory” rate of accumulation (more than 20 percent of the gross domestic product), but also managed to be reproduced by means of the classic mechanism of relative surplus value, thus making untenable the theories that attributed Brazilian capitalism’s authoritarian nature to the fact of its backwardness.15

This does not mean, however, that the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie is necessarily democratic. If the appropriation of surplus were realized exclusively by the mechanism of surplus value, it would be. But in Brazil this is not the case, given the
enormous participation of the state in the economy. This participation is close to 50 percent of the gross domestic product including the states, municipalities, and public enterprises. In this case, the forms of the appropriation of surplus via primitive accumulation (subsidies and favors) continue to be essential and lead a great part of the industrial bourgeoisie to remain authoritarian in order to be able to enjoy these favors without restriction.

So we have a curious paradox. This bourgeoisie accuses the state technobureaucracy of being authoritarian and favoring excessive state control, but in reality it is the size of the state economic apparatus and its control over the division of surplus—in favor of the top-level bourgeoisie and thus monopoly capital—that tends to make it authoritarian.

Faced with this type of reasoning, it can be concluded that the industrial bourgeoisie that is not directly linked to the state apparatus tends to be democratic; this corresponds to the middle-level or competitive bourgeoisie. On the other hand, to the extent that it depends on special orders, incentives, and state subsidies, the top-level or monopoly bourgeoisie lends toward authoritarianism. The large technobureaucratic-capitalist state thus becomes a part of the authoritarian bourgeoisie. In this case, the military and civil technobureaucracy become instruments of the top-level monopoly bourgeoisie rather than autonomous agents of authoritarianism, as bourgeois ideology claims.

If this analysis is correct, what remains to be seen is which bourgeoisie is ideologically hegemonic in Brazil. Despite the state’s great economic importance, this hegemony probably belongs to the competitive middle-level bourgeoisie and to the sectors of the large bourgeoisie that are not dependent upon the state. The Brazilian bourgeoisie’s clear tendency toward democracy starting in 1975 and particularly in 1977 when what I am calling the “1977 democratic pact” was established can be understood in these terms. Yet it is important to acknowledge that this tendency is not fully assured.

This social pact was established in 1977, soon after the authoritarian coup enacted the “April package,” and still exists today. It was never written in black and white, and many people do not have a clear consciousness of it. It is not based on the political alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie and workers (this would constitute a redefinition of the populist pact) but rather on the mutual acceptance of three key ideas: (1) democracy, which is in everyone’s interest; (2) the maintenance of capitalism, fundamental to the bourgeoisie; and (3) a moderate redistribution of income that benefits workers (see my 1981a and 1981b articles). This is a pact that does not stand in the way of class struggle, is not in contradiction with purely workers’ parties
(such as the PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores), and does not make them unfeasible; it establishes the real—although unstable—bases of a bourgeois democracy in Brazil similar to that in the central capitalist countries where class struggle is locked within a relatively stable institutional framework.

**CONCLUSION**

These six interpretations do not intend to exhaust the enormous wealth of studies and interpretations concerning Brazil. Among the three interpretations of the left (if we exclude the last one which is still in embryonic form) that of imperialist superexploitation is the most radical and least plausible interpretation; the functional-capitalist is more moderate ideologically although prejudiced by the emotional nature of its initial remarks; the new dependency interpretation includes democratic socialists and socialist democrats at the same time that it presents a more realistic analysis of Brazil. The first two are basically Marxist; the third has strong Marxist influences but includes non-Marxist writers like Celso Furtado. All are deeply critical of the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation.

On the other hand, none of them—especially the modernizing-authoritarian interpretation—comes close to a liberal interpretation. In fact, it is significant that a liberal interpretation does not exist in Brazil. From time to time, the industrial bourgeoisie tries to move in this direction, but until now has never been successful. There are democratic interpretations, as in the case of the functional-capitalist and new dependency interpretations. Because they do not confuse democracy with liberalism, these interpretations are not liberal. This is a confusion that the vulgar defenders of capitalism usually make, but in Brazil this does not reach the point of constituting a liberal-bourgeois interpretation due to its theoretical poverty and the lack of intellectuals to formulate it.

The interpretation of the project for industrial capital hegemony is an interpretation with a Marxist base. It seeks to define the new tendencies of Brazilian capitalism at a time in which the integration of industrial capital with Brazilian capitalism as a partner (although a minor one) among the central industrialized nations seems to be in an advanced stage. This does not prevent Brazil from remaining underdeveloped, dependent, and marked by profound structural disequilibrium. Yet in
becoming one of the great exporters of manufactured goods in the world, Brazil is gaining admittance to the club of central capitalist countries under the auspices of local industrial and multinational capital. It is probably within this type of framework that class struggle will take place and will only be able to move in the near future toward democratic socialism and self-management.


2 Note my research on the ethnic and social origins of the Brazilian entrepreneur that shows that 85 percent of the founders or key people responsible for the development of industrial enterprises in São Paulo were of immigrant origin and that only 3.9 percent were from the coffee bourgeoisie (1964).

3 Sérgio Silva (1976) finally gave the theoretical solution to this problem by showing the contradictory nature of the relation of coffee production to industrialization. Also, see Wilson Cano’s contribution (1977).

4 Although written collectively, the coordination of this work was the responsibility of Lúcio Kowarick and Vinícius Caldeira Brant, who evidently had such a decisive influence on the final version that we include this work in the functional-capitalist interpretation.

5 Obviously there are many other works to be included in this line of interpretation. For example, there is ISEB’s radical critique by Caio Navarro de Toledo (1977) and Maria Silvia Carvalho Franco (1978). Also see Helio Jaguaribe’s deposition on the ISEB (1979).

6 For a critique of the imperialist superexploitation interpretation made by representatives of the new dependency interpretation see Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1977). José Serra (1979), and Serra and Cardoso (1979). It is significant that there are no critiques of the functional-capitalist interpretation, attempting in this way to reach a unity of perspective with the new dependency interpretation that never existed although they do have many gray areas and points in common.

7 See my article (1963: 20-25) and book (1968: 112-118) where I again look at this question. The new facts examined in this article attempt to explain the reason why the national-bourgeois interpretation would lose its validity and why the developmentalist political model would enter in crisis, to the extent that these new facts lead to the collapse of the alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie and workers under the auspices of Getúlio Vargas and consequently of the latifundio sectors centered around the internal market.

8 I prefer the term “new dependency” because what is really essential is the definition of the new facts that change the nature of the dependency.

9 Anibal Pinto is recognized both by Tavares and Cardoso as the first formulator of the new Latin American model of industrialized underdevelopment, based on “structural heterogeneity”.
The first edition of this book (1968) contains only a partial break with the national-bourgeois interpretation, which was a fundamental part of my intellectual formation. This break is limited to an analysis of the new facts that had become outdated in that interpretation. It is only in the works of 1970 and 1972 that I adhere definitively to the new interpretation.

Based on their 1974-1975 research, Diniz and Boschi state that “to expect that a project for greater liberalization of the regime could originate from the bourgeoisie or that they could pressure in the direction of the reactivation of the mechanism of civil society would be at the most a dim short-term possibility, if not to say impossible” (1978: 199).

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1964) made a classical analysis concerning the artificial and traditionalist nature of industrial bourgeois ideology, revealing the false class consciousness on the part of Brazilian entrepreneurs in this period. Aside from the works of Eli Diniz and Renato Boschi that we have already mentioned, Luciano Martins’s (1968), Fernando Prestes Motta’s (1979), and my works should also be pointed out. However, what is important is the progressive change in bourgeois ideology to the extent that industrial capital becomes dominant.

See Ignácio Rangel’s fundamental and challenging contribution (1957a, 1981).

Luciano Martins also takes the hegemony of the Brazilian bourgeoisie as his starting point when he affirms: “If the authoritarian regime (as an economic ‘model’) was instrumental for the implementation and generalization of this capitalist social order, it now tends to become an increasing threat to its security” (1981).

It can be seen that this theory not only directly conflicts with the imperialist superexploitation interpretation but is also incompatible with Octávio Guilherme Velho’s analysis (1976) that attributes the authoritarian nature of Brazilian capitalism to the fact that it never had a true bourgeois revolution. This theory has as its reference point the authoritarian nature of the late-comer capitalist revolutions. However it is important to point out that this authoritarianism is historically transitory.

According to the calculations of Baer, Kerstenetzky, and Villela (1973: 905), state production corresponds to 50 percent of the gross domestic product. Carlos Von Doellinger calculates this percentage at 46 percent (1981).

Bolívar Lamounier, who analyses the democratization process in several works (1979, 1981) makes a significant critique of this interpretation, seeking to establish its theoretical limits (1980).

In April 1977, Congress was suspended for several days and a “package” of decrees favoring the official political party were enacted by the military government (translator’s note).

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