All texts on Brazilian Economy
Documentos 181 a 217 de 217
2004. Institutional reforms are required but are not the central priority in Brazil. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo)
2004. The method that Celso Furtado utilizes is essentially historical his passion - a measured passion - is Brazil. A survey of Furtado's work. Portuguese and English versions available. (Paper: Revista de La CEPAL)*
2004. Main economic objectives for Brazil and their viability. First regular column (every 14 days) in FSP-Dinheiro. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo).
2004. The risk involved in exporting commodites is to have the exchange rate basically determined by their costs - what may turn inviable to export manufactured goods with high added value. (Interview to Gazeta Mercantil)
2004. Policies recommended by Washington are rather a reaction to the threat represented by the new industrial countries than a genuine contribution to their economic growth. Survey of the book of Ha-Joon Chang. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo)
2004. Since 1980 Brazil's economic growth has been frustrating, bust social and political development was real, as the 1995 Public Management Reform demonstrates. (Paper: Revista de Administração Pública)*
2004. With Carmen Varela. Latin Americas quasi-stagnation in the 1990s can be explained principally by the growth cum foreign savings strategy. (Paper: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics)
2004. Summarized view of what is needed for Brazil achieve macroeconomic stability and resume growth. (Testimony to the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados, published in Revista de Economia Política, October 2004)
2004. Between 1980 and 1994 Brazil adjusted and reformed its economy. Since then a perverse macroeconomic policy kept the economy semi-stagnant. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo, Mais!)
2004. While income per capita increased 8.5% in 20 years, social expenditures, 43.4%. Given the improvement in social standards this demonstrates that social expenditures are effective. (Note: Revista Econômica)*
2004. The East and South East countries show that there is an alternative to the conventional orthodoxy which perpetuates macroeconomic instability in Brazil. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo)
2003. Conventional orthodoxy allways finds a new argument to keep the basic interest rate high. (Article: Valor Econômico,)
2003. Country risk: the ideological and the relevant rates. A comparison with Russia.(Article in Valor Econômico, 26.11.2003).
2003 Fear is again defeating hope: Brazilians' diminished aspirations. (Article in Folha de S.Paulo, 9.11.2003)
2003. Government should change Brazil's monetary policy or the country will remain semi-stagnant. (Interview to Valor Econômico, 22.10.2003)
High interest rates are ineffective against a predominantly inertial inflation. (Article in Folha de S.Paulo).
2003. The Second Washington Consensus (growth with foreing savings and open capital account) means macroeconomic instability. (Folha de S.Paulo, 11.5.2003).
2003. Brazilian elites stoped thinking and the country is in a real 'credibility trap'. (Large interview to Jornal do Commercio, 23.3.03)
1993. Articles published in the Brazilian media between March 1985 and March 1990. (Book) Available in PDF.
1979 (Article: Folha de S. Paulo, 13.12)
1979 (Article: Folha de S. Paulo, 01.04)
1979 (Article: Jornal da Tarde, 16.03)
1979 (Article: Folha de S. Paulo, 04.03)
1979 (Article: Folha de S. Paulo, 21.01)
1977. Two strategies increasing demand were central in the Brazilian 1967-73 'miracle': the concentration of income benefiting the middle class and the rich and an active export policy. (Paper: Revista de Administração de Empresas).
1975. The basic characteristics of growth model that prevailed during the military regime: the technobureaucratic-capitalist model of industrialized underdevelopment. In macroeconomic terms it was based on the supply side on the production of luxury goods, on the demand side, on concentration of income from the middle-class upwards. French version available(
1975. The basic characteristics of growth model that prevailed during the military regime: the technobureaucratic-capitalist model of industrialized underdevelopment. In macroeconomic terms, on the supply side, it was based on the production of luxury goods; on the demand side, on the concentration of income from the middle-class upwards. Portuguese version available.
1975. The recession starting in 1974 explained by an increase in the profit rate higher than the increase in the technobureaucrtic middle class' salaries.(Note: Opinião)
1970. It corresponds to "Dividir ou multiplicar?" (1970). It claims that the Brazilian "economic miracle" (1968-1973) signaled a new, export oriented, model of development that made consistent aggregate demand and supply of luxury goods by concentrating income from the middle class upwards. (Chapter 7 of Development and Crisis in Brazil: 1930-1983)
1970. My first analysis of the "new development model" that begins in Brazil in the late 1960s. Contrarily to what Furtado predicted, income concetration benefiting the middle classes was behind the resumption of growth as it made aggregate demand consistent with the production of luxury consumption goods by multinationals. "O novo modelo de desenvolvimento" (1973) elaborates on this paper. (Paper: Visão)
1968. ISEB's political model based on the aliance of the national bourgeoisie with the workers and the bureaucrats was correct. Yet, historical new facts led to the collapse of the populist and national-developmentalist pact and to the political crisis of 1961-64. (Chapter 4 of Development and Crisis in Brazil).
1966. Given the existence of a large middle classe, democracy's restoration is inevitable. In this process, Brazilian industrial entrepreneurs must associate themselves with the new business managers that are emerging and develop a national development strategy that should be democratic and socially progressive. (Paper: Revista de Administração de Empresas)
1964. My 1962 research demonstrated that the Paulista industrialists that led the Brazilian industrialization were, mostly, descendants of middle class immigrants, not from coffee planters. ( Published Portuguese version available. (Paper: this English version only published here)
1964. My 1962 research demonstrated that the Paulista industrialists that led the Brazilian industrialization were, mostly, descendants of middle class immigrants, not from coffee planters. English version available only in this site. (Paper: Revista de Administração de Empresas)
1964. An large picture of the Brazilian agriculture in the early 1960s.(Paper: Journal of Inter-American Studies)
1961. A Brazilian business school like FGV/SP should have an explicit economic development orientation. (Term paper: Michigan State University)
1958. My first paper or quasi-paper. It was written to the discussion group, "Porão", formed mostly by collegues of JUC (Juventude Universitária Católica), and coordinated by Jorge da Cunha Lima. (Paper published as FGV/SP apostila and here)